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INTRODUCTION 
 
Intellectual property licensing has grown significantly over the 
years with a global market estimated at more than $100 billion.1 In 
fact, “intellectual property assets account for 40% of the net value of 
all corporations in America.”2 Notwithstanding the likelihood of more 
and more licensing transactions, a complex area of the law, patent 
licensing has not received much attention in legal journals and 
scholarly publications.3 As companies increasingly license and cross-
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1 Kenneth L. Port, Jay Dratler, Jr., Faye M. Hammersley, Terence P. McElwee, 
Charles R. McManis & Barbara A. Wrigley, LICENSING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN 
THE INFORMATION AGE xvii (2d ed. 2005). 
2 Id. 
3 Rachel Clark Hughey, Licensee by Estoppel, 14 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 53, 54 
(2003). 
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license technologies, issues arising about the nature and meaning of 
license agreements will likely be litigated,4 particularly because 
licensing agreements combine matters governed by state contract law 
and federal patent law.5 
One area of patent licensing not discussed in depth is if a 
settlement for patent infringement may ever be considered a patent 
license agreement. The legal designation of a patent settlement as a 
patent license agreement will have implications for licensees with a 
“most favored licensee” status, a legal clause granting deferential 
treatment to a licensee in order to prevent a “competitive disadvantage 
resulting from more-favorable terms granted to another licensee.”6 
Although some courts have decided this issue, they have decided 
differently what effect, if any, a patent settlement agreement has on an 
existing third party licensee with a “most favored licensee” clause in 
the license agreement.7 
In Waterloo Furniture Components Ltd. v. Haworth, Inc.,8 a case 
of first impression9, the Seventh Circuit recently held that “[a] 
settlement for past infringement entered into after [a patent expires is 
not] a license.”10 Additionally, the Seventh Circuit acknowledged that 
federal appellate courts are divided on whether a settlement agreement 
                                                 
4 See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1841 (2006). 
5 See Rhone-Poulenc Agro v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 284 F.3d 1323, 1327-28 
(Fed. Cir. 2002). 
6 Willemijn Houdstermaatschappij, BV v. Standard Microsystems Corp., 103 
F.3d 9, 13 (2d Cir. 1997). 
7 See Ransburg Electro-Coating Corp. v. Spiller & Spiller, 489 F.2d 974 (7th 
Cir. 1973) and Studiengesellschaft Kohle v. Novamont Corp., 704 F.2d 48, (2d. Cir. 
1983) (each case finding that a patent settlement agreement may not be construed as 
a license); Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 482 F.2d 317 (6th 
Cir. 1973) and Studiengesellschaft Kohle v. Hercules, 105 F.3d 629 (Fed. Cir. 1997) 
(each ruling that a patent settlement agreement may be considered a license). 
8 Waterloo Furniture Components Ltd. v. Haworth, Inc. (“Waterloo II”), 467 F. 
3d 641 (7th Cir. 2006). 
9 For the first time, a court explicitly held that a settlement agreement is not a 
license in the context of an expired patent. Other courts, including the Seventh 
Circuit, have resolved the issue (albeit differently) in the context of an unexpired 
patent, see supra note 7. 
10 Waterloo II, 467 F.3d at 647 (emphasis added). 
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entered into before a patent expires constitutes a license.11 The 
linchpin in any of the regional appellate court’s reasoning on the issue 
boils down its their correct or incorrect understanding of what 
essentially a patent license constitutes. For example, what ultimate 
effect does a patent license serve and is a license solely prospective in 
nature with no retroactive qualities? 
Part I of this Note describes the relevant background of patent 
law, patent infringement, and patent licenses. Part II explains the 
circuit split among the Federal Regional Courts of Appeal, including 
the Waterloo decision. Part III of this Note contends that patent 
licenses have a unique nature given their purpose, including 
retroactive qualities, and that a settlement for past patent infringement, 
regardless of whether the patent has expired or not, may constitute a 
license, especially when the settlement implicates a “most favored 
licensee” clause.12 Part IV of this Note explains the implications of the 
Seventh Circuit’s Waterloo decision, especially because of the 
increasing importance of patent law and licensing agreements. 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
A. Patent Law 
 
A patent grants the patentee13 a right to exclude others from 
making, using, selling, or offering to sell the patented invention within 
the United States, or importing the invention to the United States.14 
Frequently the right to exclude is commonly misunderstood. Many 
                                                 
11 Id. at 647 n.1. 
12 Although sometimes referred to as a “most favored nation” clause, see, e.g., 
id. at 643-48, to be more accurate, this Note uses only the phrase “most favored 
licensee”.  
13 The word patentee as used in this Note has the same meaning as its statutory 
definition in 35 U.S.C. § 100 (d) (2000) (“The word ‘patentee’ includes not only the 
patentee to whom the patent was issued but also the successors in title to the 
patentee”). 
14 35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2000). 
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people, including those in the legal profession,15 experts on patent 
law,16 and even judges,17 conflate the statutory right to exclude with a 
permissive and exclusive right of the patentee to actually make, use, or 
sell the patented invention. The resulting confusion is understandable, 
however. Over the years, Congress has changed the language of the 
statute specifying the rights granted a patentee,18 and it is common for 
people to assume that intellectual property ownership, like other types 
of property ownership, carries with it the three basic property rights: 
the right to use, the right to exclude, and the right to transfer.19  
Patent laws have existed since 1790, but Congress enacted the 
current patent statute in 1952 under Title 35 of the United States 
Code.20 Because a patent grants an exclusive right to the mental 
concept of the invention, “a patent protects no single physical 
embodiment of an invention as such; rather it controls the abstract 
information in the invention, as expressed in the patent’s claims.”21 In 
                                                 
15 For instance, the well-known and generally respected Black’s Law 
Dictionary defined the rights a patent grants as “the exclusive right to make, use or 
sell an invention for a specified period” in the 7th edition. BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1147 (7th ed. 1999). However, the 8th edition defines the rights a 
patent grants as the “right to exclude.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1156 (8th ed. 
2004). 
16 See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller & Michael H. Davis, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: 
PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND COPYRIGHT IN A NUTSHELL 11 (1983) (describing the 
right a patent grants as “giving the patentee the exclusive right to make, use, or sell 
the invention”). 
17 United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 250 (1942) (“The full extent 
of the monopoly is the patentee's “exclusive right to make, use, and vend the 
invention or discovery”). 
18 See Part IIIA1, infra. 
19 See Kenneth L. Port, Jay Dratler, Jr., Faye M. Hammersley, Terence P. 
McElwee, Charles R. McManis & Barbara A. Wrigley, LICENSING INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 5-6 (2d ed. 2005). 
20 Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, § 1, 66 Stat. 792 (1952) (current version at 35 
U.S.C. §§ 1-351 (2000). 
21 Kenneth L. Port, Jay Dratler, Jr., Faye M. Hammersley, Terence P. 
McElwee, Charles R. McManis & Barbara A. Wrigley, LICENSING INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 6 (2d ed. 2005) (citing SRI Int’l v. Matsushita 
Elec. Corp., 775 F.2d 1107, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc) (“If structural claims 
4
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exchange for disclosing the patented invention in sufficient detail 
within the patent application, the Government grants the patentee a 
twenty-year monopoly from the filing date of the patent to exercise 
any of the exclusionary rights.22  
The monopolistic rights give the patentee the ability to gain 
financially from the patent in various ways.23 The patentee may sell 
the invention or rights to the invention at monopolistic prices to 
recoup any investment costs into research of the patented technology, 
or simply to realize a profit.24 The patentee may assign or license all or 
some of the patent rights to another in exchange for any price or even 
no price at all.25 A patentee may license use of the patented technology 
to another in exchange for royalties, rights to use another patented 
technology (cross-licensing agreements), or for just about anything 
that the parties agree upon.26 In short, a patent grants rights similar in 
function to holders of tangible property27—except the right to use.28  
 
                                                                                                                   
were to be limited to devices operated precisely as a specification-described 
embodiment is operated, there would be no need for claims”). 
22 35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2000). 
23 James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Lessons For Patent Policy From 
Empirical Research on Patent Litigation, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1, 9-10 (2005) 
(discussing three main sources of profits derived from patents: (1) excluding 
competitors, (2) forcing competitors to accept licenses, (3) strategically using patents 
to avoid litigation such as using patents to facilitate cross-licensing and opportunistic 
and anticompetitive patent suits based on weak or invalid patents). 
24 See, e.g., Crown Die & Tool Co. v. Nye Tool & Mach. Works, 261 U.S. 24, 
36-37 (1923) ( “[T]he government is not granting the common-law right to make, 
use and vend, but it is granting the incident of exclusive ownership of that common-
law right, which [cannot] be enjoyed save with the common-law right” and that “a 
patent confers a monopoly”); W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Carlisle Corp., 529 F.2d 
614 (3d Cir. 1976) (noting that a patent holder does not misuse a patent when the 
patentee demands an exorbitant royalty rate, essentially refusing to do business with 
the willful infringer). 
25 Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S. 252, 255-56 (1891). 
26 See Bessen & Meurer, supra note 23, at 9-10. 
27 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2000).  
28 See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2000); see also Part IIIA1, infra. 
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B. Patent Infringement 
 
Patent infringement occurs when “[anyone] without authority 
makes, uses or sells any patented invention, within the United States 
during the term of the patent thereof.”29 A patent term begins the day 
the patent issues and ends twenty years from the filing date of the 
patent application.30 An entity may infringe a patent in three ways: 
direct infringement, contributory infringement, and induced 
infringement.31 
The remedy for patent infringement may include injunctions,32 
monetary damages (including treble damages),33 and even attorney’s 
fees34 in warranted cases. By statute, the court awards monetary 
damages adequate to compensate for infringing the patented 
invention.35 A court may calculate adequate compensation based on 
the patentee’s lost profits due to the infringing activities of the 
infringer.36  
Furthermore, statutory law mandates a minimum amount of 
damages awarded to the patentee.37 A court calculates the “floor” 
award for patent infringement damage based on “a reasonable royalty 
for the use made of the invention by the infringer.”38 However, 
statutory law also places temporal limits on the amount of damages 
sought by the patentee.39 35 U.S.C. § 286 confines collecting damages 
to six years “prior to the filing” of an infringement claim.40 
                                                 
29 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000). 
30 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1)-(2) (2000). 
31 35 U.S.C. § 271(b)-(c) (2000). 
32 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2000). 
33 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000). 
34 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2000). 
35 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000). 
36 Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, 575 F.2d 1152, 1156 (6th Cir. 
1978). 
37 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000). 
38 Id. 
39 35. U.S.C. § 286 (2000). 
40 Id. 
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Lastly, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has exclusive 
appellate jurisdiction in cases involving issues of patent law.41 The 
Federal Circuit is a court of Federal Appeals especially created to hear, 
among other things, patent cases appealed from Federal District Courts 
and, as such, has no geographic limitations within the United States 
and its territories.42 Thus, substantive patent law comes substantially 
from the Federal Circuit or the Supreme Court.43 Although after 
Holmes Group Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Systems,44 other federal 
appellate courts may decide substantive patent law issues when a 
compulsory counterclaim pleads substantive patent law issues, even 
though the complaint does not assert any claim arising under the 
patent laws of the United States.45 
 
C. Licensing 
 
The owner of a patent may grant licenses to others.46 Since the 
patentee has the right to exclude others from making, using, offering 
for sale or selling, or importing the invention,47 no one else may 
engage in any of these acts without the patentee’s permission without 
risking liability for infringement.48 While federal statutory and case 
law governs substantive patent law, state laws govern interpretation of 
license agreements due to their contractual nature.49 However, where 
                                                 
41 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2000) (“The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit shall have exclusive jurisdiction . . . of an appeal from a final 
decision of a district court of the United States . . . based, in whole or in part, on 
section 1338 of this title”); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2000) (“The district courts 
shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any Act of Congress 
relating to patents”). 
42 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (2000). 
43 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (2000); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (2000). 
44535 U.S. 826 (2002) 
45Holmes Group Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., 535 U.S. 826, 830 
(2002). 
46 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2000). 
47 35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2000). 
48 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000). 
49 See Rhone-Poulenc Agro, S.A., v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 284 F.3d 1323, 
1327-28 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
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state contract law yields inconsistent results with federal patent policy, 
federal patent law governs.50 
Patent license agreements may be exclusive, partially exclusive, 
or nonexclusive.51 A license “[i]n its simplest form . . . means only 
leave to do a thing which the licensor otherwise would have a right to 
prevent.”52 Thus, a patent license agreement is in essence nothing 
more than a promise by the licensor not to sue the licensee,53 though 
an exclusive license agreement may also grant the licensee the right to 
sue other infringers.54  
A patentee may limit the license agreement by geography, by 
duration, or by invention scope.55 A license may grant unrestricted or 
limited use in a particular field.56 For example, a patentee may limit a 
license agreement for a patented veterinary drug to only dogs in 
California for two years but not other animals in other states. 
Generally, the license agreement may include whatever provisions the 
                                                 
50 In re CFLC, Inc., 89 F.3d 673, 677 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Lear v. Adkins, 
395 U.S. 653, 673 (1969)) (“The construction of a patent license is generally a 
matter of state contract law, except where state law ‘would be inconsistent with the 
aims of federal patent policy’”).  
51 Drackett Chem. Co. v. Chamberlain Co., 63 F.2d 853, 855 (6th Cir. 1933). 
52 W. Elec. Co., Inc. v. Pacent Reproducer Corp. 42 F.2d 116, 118 (2d Cir. 
1930). 
53 Jim Arnold Corp. v. Hydrotech Sys., 109 F.3d 1567, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
54 See Group One, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 254 F.3d 1041, 1053 (Fed. Cir. 
2001) (Lourie, J. additional remarks) (“A patent license, if it is non-exclusive, is an 
agreement to forbear from suit. If the license is exclusive, it may be tantamount to an 
assignment of the patent”); see also Intellectual Prop. Dev., Inc. v. TCI Cablevision 
of Cal., Inc., 248 F.3d 1333, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“An exclusive licensee receives 
more substantial rights in a patent than a nonexclusive licensee, but receives fewer 
rights than an assignee of all substantial patent rights”). 
55 See Spindelfabrik Suessen-Schurr Stahlecker & Grill GmbH v. Schubert & 
Salzer Maschinenfabrik Aktiengesellschaft, 829 F.2d 1075, 1081 (Fed. Cir. 1987) 
(“In any event, patent license agreements can be written to convey different scopes 
of promises not to sue, e.g., a promise not to sue under a specific patent or, more 
broadly, a promise not to sue under any patent the licensor now has or may acquire 
in the future”); see also Intellectual Prop. Dev., 248 F.3d at 1345 (“[A]n exclusive 
licensee could receive the exclusive right to practice an invention within a given 
limited territory”). 
56 Gen. Talking Pictures Corp. v. W. Elec. Co., 305 U.S. 124, 181 (1938). 
8
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parties agree upon, such as the payment of royalties, duration of the 
agreement, exclusive or non-exclusive terms, and permitted uses—for 
example, selling but not making.57 
A license is a contract,58 and may be written or oral,59 express60 or 
implied.61 The terms and conditions of the license must be consistent 
with the scope of the patent.62 No particular form of license is 
required.63 A license may also explicitly include a release from past 
infringement,64 though the agreement itself releases the infringer from 
any rights of the patentee to exclude the infringer from using the 
patented invention.65  
License agreements may also include a “Most Favored Licensee” 
(MFL) or “Most Favored Nation” clause. A MFL clause protects the 
licensee from “a competitive disadvantage resulting from more-
favorable terms granted to another licensee.”66 MFL status assures the 
licensee that it will not pay more in royalties than another licensee, 
and usually that the licensor will inform the licensee of any other 
                                                 
57 Id. at 127 (quoting United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 489 
(1926)) (“[T]he patentee may grant a license ‘upon any condition the performance of 
which is reasonably within the reward which the patentee by the grant of the patent 
is entitled to secure’”).  
58 Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354, 1369-
70 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
59 De Forest Radio Tel. Co. v. United States, 273 U.S. 236, 241 (1927). 
60 Michael J. Swope, Comment, Recent Developments in Patent Law: Implied 
License – An Emerging Threat to Contributory Infringement Protection, 68 TEMP. L. 
REV. 281 (1995) (“An express license operates by written or oral contract between 
the patent owner and the purchaser of the product”). 
61 Hughey, supra note 3, at 55-56. 
62 Id. 
63 De Forest Radio Tel. Co., 273 U.S. at 241. 
64 United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 297 (1948) (“By accepting 
[the license agreements,] they secured release from claims for past infringement 
through a provision to that effect in the license”).  
65 Id. at 343 (“[The] nonexclusive license agreement . . . served only to release 
the licensee from the right of the patent holder to exclude him from making, using or 
selling a patented article”); see Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 168 
(1931). 
66 Willemijn Houdstermaatschappij, BV v. Standard Microsystems Corp., 103 
F.3d 9, 13 (2d Cir. 1997). 
9
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licensees and the terms of their agreements.67 Essentially, MFL clauses 
suggest that licensed competitors should be treated equally, so long as 
they bear equivalent obligations to the licensor/patentee. 
 
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT AND WATERLOO 
 
Four federal courts of appeal have decided the issue of whether a 
settlement agreement for patent infringement may constitute a license 
for an unexpired patent: the Second, Sixth, Seventh, and Federal 
Circuits.68 The Second and Seventh circuits decided the issue 
differently than the Sixth and Federal circuits, and thus their decisions 
differ in the effect a patent settlement agreement has on an existing 
third party licensee with a “most favored licensee” clause in the 
license agreement.69 
The Seventh Circuit in the Waterloo decision, however, is the only 
appellate court to decide the issue in the context of an expired patent. 
A review of the reasoning justifying the holdings of the other federal 
regional appellate courts in the context of an unexpired patent will 
help define the split among the circuits and illuminate how that split 
influenced the Seventh Circuit’s Waterloo decision. First, this Note 
will explain the circuit split, beginning with the Second and Seventh 
circuits, followed by the Sixth and Federal Circuits. Finally, this Note 
will explain the relevant details and reasoning of the Seventh Circuit’s 
Waterloo decision. 
 
                                                 
67 See, e.g., Studiengesellschaft Kohle, m.b.H. v. Hercules, Inc., 105 F.3d 629, 
633 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (noting that the licensor's obligation was to notify the licensee 
of the terms and conditions of any other license agreements, not simply “more 
favorable” license agreements in the licensors opinion). 
68 Studiengesellschaft Kohle v. Novamont Corp., 704 F.2d 48, (2d. Cir. 1983); 
Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 482 F.2d 317 (6th Cir. 1973); 
Ransburg Electro-Coating Corp. v. Spiller & Spiller, 489 F.2d 974 (7th Cir. 1973); 
Studiengesellschaft Kohle v. Hercules, 105 F.3d 629 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
69 See Ransburg, 489 F.2d 974 and Novamont, 704 F.2d 48 (each case finding 
that a patent settlement agreement may not be construed as a license); Shatterproof 
Glass, 482 F.2d 317 and Hercules, 105 F.3d 629 (each ruling that a patent settlement 
agreement may be considered a license). 
10
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A. Other Federal Courts of Appeal Decisions 
 
1. According to the Second and Seventh Circuits, a settlement 
agreement is not a license before a patent expires. 
 
Two federal appellate circuits have held that a settlement 
agreement entered into before a patent expires is not a license 
agreement: the Second Circuit in Studiengesellschaft Kohle v. 
Novamont Corp.70 and the Seventh Circuit in Ransburg Electro-
Coating Corp. v. Spiller & Spiller.71 Because this Note focuses on the 
Waterloo decision, only a cursory overview of the reasoning and any 
pertinent facts in the cases will be given, beginning with the Second 
Circuit decision in Novamont Corp. 
In Novamont Corp., the court held that a settlement agreement for 
past infringement did not implicate the MFL status of a licensee.72 The 
court considered the “treatment of an earlier licensee, who was entitled 
to a MFL clause and a competitor who took a license later, after a 
period of infringing activity.”73 The licensor granted a license to 
Novamont in 1967 to produce certain polymers of propylene.74 The 
license included a “Most Favored Licensee” (MFL) clause requiring 
the licensor to “promptly furnish Novamont with the full text of any 
licenses granted under the [patent], if . . . considered in their entirety, 
the licenses were more favorable than those in the licensee agreement 
[with Novamont].”75  
Later, the licensor granted a third-party competitor a license but 
did not promptly inform Novamont about the new agreement.76 When 
the licensor finally did inform Novamont of the agreement, the 
licensor did not include in the notification a particular clause within 
                                                 
70 704 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1983). 
71 489 F.2d 974 (7th Cir. 1973). 
72 Novamont, 704 F.2d at 52. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 50. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 51-52 
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the agreement.77 The clause in the agreement released the third-party 
competitor from past infringement pending the outcome of another 
infringement case and permitted the third-party competitor to credit 
any money the licensor recovered from the third-party competitor for 
past infringement against royalties the third-party competitor owed the 
licensor.78  
In other words, the third-party competitor would pay the licensor 
royalties for past infringement that would count towards the future 
royalties the third-party competitor owed the licensor under the license 
agreement, a two-birds-for-one-stone-type agreement. After Novamont 
learned of the undisclosed clause, they requested the same treatment, 
believing that the clause permitted the third-party competitor to pay a 
reduced royalty because the royalty covered both past and future 
infringing use of the patented technology.79 
The Second Circuit disagreed that the clause settling past 
infringement implicated Novamont’s MFL status for two reasons.80 
First, Novamont could not have benefited from the second license 
agreement because Novamont had not been an infringer at the time the 
third-party competitor and the licensor reached the second 
agreement.81 
Second, granting Novamont the benefit of the second license 
agreement terms would require the licensor to insist upon a payment 
for past infringement from the third-party competitor equal to the 
“royalty terms governing [Novamont] during the same period, or [the 
licensor] must make a refund to [Novamont].”82 Ultimately, the court 
decided that MFL clauses do not require such a high “degree of 
equivalency” and courts “have declined to interpret the clauses with 
that breadth.”83 The court declined to discuss in any detail the 
prospective or retroactive qualities of a patent license agreement, 
                                                 
77 Id. at 51-52 
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 52. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
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briefly acknowledging that the Sixth Circuit’s earlier reasoning in 
Shatterproof Glass did not persuade them.84 
Next, this Note will review the Seventh Circuit’s Ransburg 
decision, holding that a patent license agreement is prospective in 
nature and not equivalent to a release for past infringement.85 In 
Ransburg, an accused infringer settled a patent infringement suit by 
making monthly installments to compensate the patentee.86 Later, in a 
separate infringement action, a court held the patent invalid.87 The 
infringer subsequently ceased making payments under the terms of the 
settlement agreement.88 The patentee sued the accused infringer to 
recover the remaining amount owed under the settlement agreement.89  
The Seventh Circuit rejected the infringer’s arguments that the 
settlement agreement was a retroactive licensing agreement and that 
because the patent was now invalid, the infringer no longer had to pay 
the patentee as obligated by the earlier settlement agreement.90  
To require the infringer to continue payment of the settlement 
agreement would be contrary to the Supreme Court’s policy of 
“ridding the public of invalid patents thereby dedicating ideas to the 
common good,” or so the infringer argued.91 The court disagreed with 
the infringer, reasoning that a patent license has only a prospective 
quality, negating any possible retroactive effects of a patent license.92 
Thus, a patent license is not equivalent to a release for past 
wrongdoing (a settlement agreement).93 Moreover, the court listed the 
public policy reasons for continuing to enforce a settlement agreement 
                                                 
84 Id. at 52 n.5. 
85 Ransburg Electro-Coating Corp. v. Spiller & Spiller, 489 F.2d 974, 977-78 
(7th Cir. 1973). 
86 Id. at 976. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. at 977. 
91 Id.  
92 Id. at 977-78. 
93 Id. 
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for infringement of a patent, even though the patent was subsequently 
found invalid.94 
 
2. According to the Sixth and Federal Circuits, a settlement agreement 
may be a license before a patent expires. 
 
In contrast to Novamont and Ransburg, two other federal appellate 
circuits have held that a settlement agreement entered into before a 
patent expires is a license agreement: the Sixth Circuit in Shatterproof 
Glass Corp. v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co.95 and the Federal Circuit in 
Studiengesellschaft Kohle v. Hercules.96 Again, only a cursory 
overview of the reasoning and any pertinent facts in the cases will be 
given, beginning with the Sixth Circuit decision in Shatterproof Glass. 
The Shatterproof Glass case, in which the Sixth circuit held that a 
patent settlement agreement may constitute a license for purposes of a 
MFL clause,97 entails a few unique facts. Shatterproof Glass, a second 
licensee, entered into a licensing agreement with a licensor in 1955.98 
The licensing agreement included a MFL clause that covered not only 
future licenses but also already existing licenses with other third 
parties.99  
The first licensee had originally entered a licensing agreement in 
1931.100 Later, the first licensee entered into another agreement in 
1961 for a release of infringement prior to 1961 of certain patents and 
a paid-up license under another patent in exchange for lump sum 
payments.101 The license agreement also included a royalty rate for 
future use of other patents.102  
The licensor failed to notify Shatterproof Glass of the more 
favorable terms found in the 1931 and 1961 agreements, in violation 
                                                 
94 Id. at 977-78. 
95 482 F.2d 317 (6th 1973). 
96 105 F.3d 629 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
97 Shatterproof Glass, 482 F.2d at 321. 
98 Id. at 318. 
99 Id. at 318 n.1. 
100 Id. at 319. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
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of the MFL clause.103 Shatterproof Glass sought to recover royalties 
already paid in excess of the more favorable rates the first licensee had 
paid.104 
Shatterproof Glass argued that the “nature of the [agreements]” 
and not their label is controlling, and “that properly construed, the 
document is a retroactive license.”105 The Sixth Circuit agreed, 
reasoning that “a release can, in certain circumstances, have the effect 
of and be construed as a license.”106 Additionally the court recognized 
that a patent license is “a mere waiver of the right to sue by the 
patentee.”107 Moreover, the agreement that released the first licensee 
from any claims of infringement “was in effect a settlement by 
payment of just compensation for previous use of the patent . . . 
[otherwise] evasion of a ‘favored [licensee]’ clause [would be] 
possible.”108 
Turning now to the Studiengesellschaft Kohle, m.b.H., v. Hercules, 
Inc. case,109 the Federal Circuit held that a MFL licensee was entitled 
to the same terms as a settlement for past infringement by a third-party 
competitor.110 In Hercules, a licensor, failed to notify a MFL licensee, 
Hercules, of another license agreement with a third-party competitor, 
in violation of the MFL clause.111 Meanwhile, Hercules had stopped 
paying royalties during a six-year period, triggering the licensor to 
commence a patent infringement lawsuit against Hercules.112  
After Hercules discovered the third-party competitor license 
agreement with more favorable royalty rates and a release for past 
infringement, Hercules requested a retroactive license with royalty 
rates similar to the third-party competitor license agreement, reaching 
                                                 
103 Id. at 319-20. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. at 320. 
106 Id. (citing De Forest Radio Tel. Co. v. United States, 273 U.S. 236, 241-42 
(1927)). 
107 Shatterproof Glass, 482 F.2d at 320. 
108 Id. at 321. 
109 105 F.3d 629 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
110 Id. at 634. 
111 Id. at 631-32. 
112 Id. at 632. 
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back to the date any allegedly infringing activities began, “thereby 
insulating itself from any infringement claim.” 113  
The Federal Circuit observed that “absolving six years of 
infringement via a retroactive license [was] troubling” because it was 
uncertain if Hercules would have accepted a similar agreement had the 
licensor offered Hercules the same terms as the third-party competitor 
license agreement within the timeframe required by the MFL clause.114 
Nevertheless, because the licensor breached the MFL clause by not 
notifying Hercules of the third-party competitor license agreement 
within the required timeframe, the uncertainty was the licensor’s to 
bear.115  
The Federal Circuit ruled that “Hercules [was] entitled to the 
terms of the [third-party competitor] license effective May 1980, when 
the [third-party competitor] license became effective.”116 Notably, the 
Federal Circuit did not dwell on the prospective-retroactive potential 
dualism of a patent license as did the Seventh117 and Sixth118 circuits. 
Instead, the court apparently accepted the possibility of a retroactive 
license as a concept requiring little to no justification, almost as if the 
concept itself was self-evident.119 The uncertain actions of the parties 
caused the Federal Circuit some hesitancy with its decision but not the 
concept of a retroactive license itself.120 
The Sixth and Seventh Circuit courts extensively discussed their 
rationale for why they decided a settlement agreement or release from 
past infringement may or may not be considered a patent license, 
emphasizing the retroactive, or alternatively, the sole prospective 
                                                 
113 Id. at 634. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
117 Ransburg Electro-Coating Corp. v. Spiller & Spiller, 489 F.2d 974, 977 (7th 
Cir. 1973). 
118 Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 482 F.2d 317, 320 (6th 
1973). 
119 See id. 
120 See id. 
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quality of patent licenses.121 The Seventh Circuit in Waterloo was no 
different. 
 
B. The Waterloo Case 
 
The Seventh Circuit is the only court to address whether 
settlement agreements for past infringement may constitute a patent 
license even though the patent has expired. In Waterloo, the Seventh 
Circuit held that “[a] settlement for past infringement entered into 
after [a patent expires is not] a license.”122 Additionally, the Seventh 
Circuit acknowledged that federal appellate courts are divided on 
whether a settlement agreement entered into before a patent expires 
constitutes a license.123 As will be discussed in greater detail below,124 
the linchpin in Seventh Circuit’s reasoning boils down to their correct 
or incorrect understanding of what essentially a patent license 
constitutes.  
Waterloo manufactures keyboard support devices.125 Haworth 
owned Patent No. 4,616,798 (the ‘798 patent) for a computer keyboard 
adjustable support, which attaches to the underside of a desk.126 In 
December 1992, Waterloo and Haworth entered into a licensing 
agreement to resolve an infringement claim Haworth brought against 
Waterloo.127 Although the parties executed the agreement in December 
1992, it retroactively covered Waterloo’s past infringement that 
occurred before December 1992.128 
The agreement included a MFL clause wherein Haworth promised 
to automatically offer Waterloo a more favorable royalty rate if 
                                                 
121 See, e.g., Ransburg Electro-Coating Corp., 489 F.2d at 977; Shatterproof 
Glass Corp., 482 F.2d 317, 320 (6th 1973).  
122 Waterloo Furniture Components Ltd. v. Haworth, Inc. (“Waterloo II”), 467 
F. 3d 641, 647 (7th Cir. 2006) (emphasis added). 
123 Id. at 647 n.1. 
124 See Part III, infra. 
125 Id. at 643. 
126 Id. at 644. 
127 Id. 
128 Waterloo Furniture Components v. Haworth, Inc. (“Waterloo I”), 402 F. 
Supp. 2d 950, 952 (N.D. Ill 2005), aff’d, Waterloo II, 467 F.3d 641 (7th Cir. 2006). 
17
Sneddon: Licensee Beware: The Seventh Circuit Holds That a Patent License
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2007
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                           Volume 2, Issue 2                       Spring 2007 
813 
Haworth licensed the ‘798 patent to a third party at a more favorable 
rate.129 The license agreement also included the express intention of 
the parties, namely that “Waterloo is treated no less favorably than 
direct competitors of Waterloo in regard to licensing of the ‘798 
patent.” 130 Moreover, Haworth promised to provide written notice to 
Waterloo of any subsequent third party license agreement and its terms 
within thirty days following the license agreement’s execution.131 
Michigan law governed the agreement.132 
In 1997, a third party, SoftView, filed a declaratory judgment 
action against Haworth, arguing that SoftView was not infringing the 
‘798 patent.133 Haworth filed a counterclaim in June 1998 that 
SoftView had infringed the ‘798 patent.134 On December 9, 2003, after 
five and half years of litigation, the parties reached an agreement in 
principle to settle the case. 135 A formal settlement was executed on 
March 24, 2004.136 Meanwhile, the ‘798 patent expired on October 14, 
2003.137 
Waterloo learned about the settlement agreement and requested a 
copy from Haworth.138 Haworth responded that its agreement with 
SoftView was confidential.139 Waterloo filed a breach of contract claim 
in the Northern District of Illinois because it suspected that its 
licensor, Haworth, had entered into a settlement agreement that offered 
an infringing competitor more favorable royalty terms than the terms 
of Waterloo’s own license.140  
                                                 
129 Waterloo II, 467 F.3d at 644. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. at 643. 
138 Id. at 644. 
139 Id. 
140 Waterloo Furniture Components v. Haworth, Inc. (“Waterloo I”), 402 F. 
Supp. 2d 950, 951 (N.D. Ill 2005). 
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Haworth moved for summary judgment, and Waterloo served 
discovery requests, including a request to see the SoftView/Haworth 
settlement agreement.141 The district court halted discovery sua sponte 
and granted Haworth’s summary judgment motion after allowing the 
parties to submit briefs on the summary judgment motion.142  
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, 
holding that “a settlement for past infringement entered into after [a] 
patent’s expiration [does not] constitute a license.”143 The court 
reasoned that a license is only prospective in nature because a patent 
license grants a licensee a future right to make or use the patented 
invention.144  
In affirming the district court’s judgment, the Seventh Circuit 
went beyond what was necessary to adjudicate the case. The district 
court merely found that the license agreement between Waterloo and 
Haworth expired, and as a result, neither party had any obligations to 
each other at the time Haworth and SoftView entered into a settlement 
agreement.145  
The Seventh Circuit agreed with the district court’s interpretation 
of the Haworth/Waterloo agreement, at which point the adjudication 
could have ended.146 But then the court went on to hold that a 
settlement agreement may not be considered a license agreement after 
the patent expired (even if the Haworth/Waterloo agreement was still 
in force at the time Haworth and SoftView executed their settlement 
agreement) thus still negating Waterloo’s breach of contract claims.147 
 
                                                 
141 Waterloo II, 467 F.3d at 644. 
142 Waterloo I, 402 F. Supp. 2d at 953. Although the district court held that the 
licensing agreement terminated with the patent’s expiration, Waterloo I, 402 F. 
Supp. 2d at 953, to which the Seventh Circuit agreed, Waterloo II, 467 F.3d at 645-
46, whether the contract’s terms were correctly interpreted by the Federal Courts is 
beyond the scope of this Note. 
143 Waterloo II, 467 F.3d at 647. 
144 Id. 
145 Waterloo I, 402 F. Supp. 2d at 953. 
146 Waterloo II, 467 F.3d at 645-47. 
147 Id. 
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III. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S MISSTEPS 
 
The Seventh Circuit made several missteps in the Waterloo case. 
First, it made incorrect assumptions about the nature of a patent 
license. The Seventh Circuit incorrectly defined what constitutes a 
patent law license, oddly relying in part on a 1951 edition of Black’s 
Law Dictionary.148 Moreover, because the court began with the wrong 
definition of a patent license, the court then incorrectly deemed that 
licenses may only be prospective in nature.149 The court then bolstered 
these assumptions by implying that an expired patent retains no value 
to the patentee, and thus a patent license may only be prospective in 
nature.150 In reality, the first misstep combines a series of flawed 
missteps. 
Second, the court arguably ignored the Supreme Court’s analysis 
of the legal effects of a patent license and should have been more 
deferential to the Federal Circuit,151 the court Congress especially 
created to determine patent issues and bring uniformity to patent 
laws.152 
Third and finally, not only did the Seventh Circuit make wrong 
assumptions in its reasoning, but also it ignored the actual negotiation 
process and result of both a licensing agreement and a settlement 
agreement for patent infringement. Instead, the Seventh Circuit 
focused on the labels given to a document ending disputes negotiated 
under threat of litigation or actual litigation and not its substance. 
 
A. Incorrect Assumptions Made About the Nature of Licenses 
 
The first misstep actually involves a series of flawed missteps. 
The Seventh Circuit made three incorrect primary assumptions about 
                                                 
148 Id. 
149 Id. 
150 Id. at 641. 
151 See Part IIIB, infra. 
152 Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., 535 U.S. 826, 838 
(2002) (noting that the Federal Circuit “was created, in part, to promote uniformity 
in the development [patent] law”). 
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the nature of a patent license and patents in general. The court began 
with a wrong definition of a patent license,153 and then the court relied 
on that definition in deciding that patent licenses have only 
prospective qualities.154 Finally, the court bolstered the prospective 
quality of a patent license with the mistaken implication that an 
expired patent no longer has value.155 Before we detail the series of 
missteps and why they are flawed, however, this Note will detail the 
Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in Waterloo. 
Broken down, the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in Waterloo follows 
these steps. First, a patent license grants a licensee a permissive right 
to use the patented invention.156 Because a patent license grants the 
licensee a permissive, future right to use the patented invention, a 
patent license can only be prospective in nature.157 Furthermore, 
because a patent license is prospective in nature, a patentee may not 
license a patent after its expiration; indeed “there is nothing left for the 
patent holder to license.” 158 Thus, a settlement entered into after a 
patent’s expiration is not a license.159  
Implied in this reasoning is that a settlement may be both 
prospective and retrospective in nature, i.e. a settlement agreement 
may release the infringer from past tortious acts in addition to any 
future ones that may occur. The Seventh Circuit also reinforced its 
decision by implying that an expired patent no longer has value or may 
be sued upon.160 
The mistakes made in the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning flow from 
their beginning assumptions, namely that a license grants permissive 
rights and is only prospective in nature.161 By starting on the wrong 
foot, the Seventh Circuit ended up in the wrong place. 
 
                                                 
153 Waterloo II, 467 F.3d at 647. 
154 Id. 
155 Id. at 647-48. 
156 Id. at 647. 
157 Id. 
158 Id. at 647-48. 
159 Id. at 647. 
160 Id. 
161 Id. 
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1. A patent license is in essence a promise not to sue the licensee, not a 
grant to the licensee of rights to use the patented invention. 
 
The Seventh Circuit started off on the wrong foot. First, the 
Seventh Circuit mistakenly understood a license as a “written 
authority granted by the owner of a patent to another person 
empowering the latter to make or use the patented article for a limited 
period or in a limited territory.”162 Surprisingly, and somewhat oddly, 
the Seventh Circuit relied on the fourth edition of Black’s Law 
Dictionary, published in 1951, as its quoted authority on what a patent 
license constitutes.163  
Why seek a definition of a patent license from an out-of-date, 
albeit generally respected, legal dictionary instead of precedent from 
the Federal Circuit? Even better, why not consult Supreme Court 
precedent on the meaning of a license in the context of patent law? As 
will be shown, both types of precedential and persuasive authority 
were amply available for the Seventh Circuit’s choosing.164  
Before reviewing various Federal Circuit definitions of a patent 
license, a short review of the rights conferred by a patent is in order. 
Only after a correct understanding of the property rights a patent 
grants a patentee can a proper understanding of the rights a patent 
license grants a licensee be reached. 
By statute, a patent grants the patentee “the right to exclude others 
from making, using, selling, or offering to sell” the patented invention 
within the United States.165 However, the exact contours of this right 
were not always unmistakably comprehended because of ambiguities 
in the statute language prior to 1952.166 In the 1946 Patent Act for 
example,167 Congress established that a patent granted the patentee 
                                                 
162 Id. 
163 Id. 
164 See Part IIIB, infra. 
165 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2000). 
166 P.J. Federico, Commentary on the New Patent Act, 35 U.S.C.A. § 1 (West 
1954), reprinted in 75 J. PATENT TRADEMARK OFFICE SOCIETY 161, 201 (1993) 
(“The exact rights conferred by a patent were difficult to understand and explain 
under the [pre-1952] language”). 
167 Patent Act of 1946, ch. 726, 60 Stat. 778 (1946). 
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“the exclusive right to make, use, and vend the invention . . . 
throughout the United States.”168 This older version of the Patent Act 
may help explain the erroneous definition of a patent law license 
found in the 1951 fourth edition of Black’s Law Dictionary169 and 
subsequently relied upon by the Seventh Circuit.170 As will be 
discussed in greater detail below, the phrase “exclusive right to [use]” 
created an ambiguity in the understanding of the rights conferred by a 
patent.  
After 1951, Congress enacted the current Patent Act in 1952, 
revising the statutory language describing the rights a patent 
confers.171 The current statute utilizes the same relevant language from 
the 1952 Patent Act with some minor additions.172 At present, a patent 
grants the patentee “the right to exclude others from making, using, 
offering for sale, or selling the invention.”173 In relevant part, 
Congress omitted the word “exclusive” from the 1942 Patent Act and 
added the words “exclude others from” in the 1952 Patent Act,174 
clarifying the tenor of rights a patent grants a patentee to conform with 
existing law as interpreted by the Supreme Court.175 
Although the 1952 Patent Act revised the language describing the 
rights conferred by a patent to render the meaning clearer, the 
Supreme Court has concluded on numerous occasions that a patent 
                                                 
168 35 U.S.C. § 40 (1946). 
169 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1068 (4th ed. 1951). 
170 Waterloo Furniture Components Ltd. v. Haworth, Inc. (“Waterloo II”), 467 
F. 3d 641, 647 (7th Cir. 2006). 
171 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1952) (“Every patent shall . . . grant to the patentee . . . the 
right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the invention throughout the 
United States”). 
172 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2000) (adding the phrase “offering for sale”). 
173 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2000) (emphasis added). 
174 Id. Congress also added the phrase “offering for sale” sometime after the 
1952 Patent Act. 
175 S. REP. NO. 82-1979 (1952), as reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2417 
(“The wording of the granting clause is changed to ‘the right to exclude others from 
making, using, or selling’, following language used by the Supreme Court, to render 
the meaning clearer”) (emphasis added). 
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confers the right to exclude others from using176 the invention.177 At 
other times, the Court has declared that a patent grants the patentee the 
right to use the invention.178 The perhaps seemingly inconsistent views 
of the Court are explained below. 
In Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co.,179 the 
Court extensively discussed the rights granted a patentee and the 
theories supporting those rights.180 The Court endorsed the view that a 
common law understanding of property already granted the patentee a 
right to use his invention,181 and that the only right Congress granted 
                                                 
176 For the reader’s sake, the terms “use” or “using,” in the context of rights 
granted a patentee here and throughout this Note, include the statutory rights of 
making, using, selling and offering to sell when not explicitly listed.  
177 Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. 539, 549 (1853) (“The franchise which the 
patent grants, consists altogether in the right to exclude every one from making, 
using, or vending the thing patented, without the permission of the patentee. This is 
all [the patentee] obtains by the patent”); United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United States, 
258 U.S. 451, 463 (1922) (citing Bloomer, 55 U.S. 539) (“From an early day it has 
been held by this court that the franchise secured by a patent consists only in the 
right to exclude others from making, using, or vending the thing patented without the 
permission of the patentee”); see also United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 
287, 316 (1948) (Douglas, J. concurring) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, Cl. 8) (“It 
is to be noted first that all that is secured to inventors is ‘the exclusive right’ to their 
inventions”); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp. et al., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974) 
(Patent laws promote progress of science and useful arts “by offering a right of 
exclusion for a limited period as an incentive to inventors”). 
178 United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 250 (1942) (“The full 
extent of the monopoly is the patentee's ‘exclusive right to make, use, and vend the 
invention or discovery’”). 
179 210 U.S. 405 (1908). 
180 Id. at 423-25.  
181 Id. at 424-25 (“[The patentee] receives nothing from the law that he did not 
have before”); accord Bauer & Cie v. O’Donnell, 229 U.S. 1, 10 (1913) (“The right 
to make, use and sell an invented article is not derived from the patent law. This 
right existed before and without the passage of the law and was always the right of 
an inventor”); Crown Die & Tool Co. v. Nye Tool & Mach. Works, 261 U.S. 24, 34-
35 (1923) (“[This] Court held that the Government did not confer on the patentee the 
right himself to make, use or vend his own invention, that such right was a right 
under the common law not arising under the federal patent laws and not within the 
grant of power to Congress to enact such laws”). 
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by statute was the exclusive right to use the invention,182 which the 
Court interpreted as the right to exclude others from using the 
invention.183 
In summary, Congress never conferred by patent the statutory 
right to use the invention although the language used to describe the 
rights conferred by patent may have been misunderstood as conferring 
a “right to use” in the 1942 Patent Act and all previous versions of the 
Patent Act.184 Rather, Congress only intended the statutory language to 
                                                 
182 Cont’l Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. at 423-25 (“Congress has . . . guaranteed 
[the patentee] an exclusive right to [his invention] for a limited time”); accord 
Bauer, 229 U.S. at 10 (“The [Patent Act] secured to the inventor the exclusive right 
to make, use and vend the thing patented”); see Crown Die, 261 U.S. at 34-35. 
183 Cont’l Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. at 423-25 (“[T]he only effect of the patent 
is to restrain others from manufacturing and using that which he has invented”); 
accord Bauer, 229 U.S. at 10 (The Patent Act consequently, “secured to the inventor 
the exclusive right . . . to prevent others from [using the patented invention] without 
the consent of the patentee”); Crown Die, 261 U.S. at 34-35 (“[This] Court further 
held that in its essence all that the Government conferred by the patent was the right 
to exclude others from making, using or vending his invention”). 
184 The previous Patent Acts used some form of the phrase “right to use the 
invention,” albeit with different wording over the years. The Supreme Court 
summarized the historical changes in the language used to describe the rights 
conferred by patent in the relevant statutes for the Patent Acts of 1790, 1793, 1736, 
and 1870 as follows: 
The protection given to inventors and authors in the United States 
originated in the Constitution, § 8 of Art. I of which authorizes the 
Congress “to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by 
securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive 
right to their respective writings and discoveries.” This protection, 
so far as inventors are concerned, has been conferred by an act of 
Congress passed April 10, 1790, and subsequent acts and 
amendments. The act of 1790, 1 Stat. 109, c. 7, granted “the sole 
and exclusive right and liberty of making, constructing, using and 
vending to others to be used, the said invention or discovery.” In 
1793 (Feb. 21, 1793, 1 Stat. 318, c. 11) the word “full” was 
substituted for the word “sole,” and in 1836 (July 4, 1836, 5 Stat. 
117, § 5, c. 357) the word “constructing” was omitted. This 
legislation culminated in § 4884 of the Revised Statutes, the part 
with which we are dealing being practically identical with the act 
of July 8, 1870, 16 Stat. 198, § 22, c. 230. It provides that every 
patent shall contain “a grant to the patentee, his heirs and assigns, 
25
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grant the property right to exclude others from using the invention.185 
In other words, even though the statutory language in the Patent Acts 
before 1952 used the phrase “exclusive right to use” in describing the 
rights conferred by patent, Supreme Court cases interpreted that phrase 
to mean that a patent only grants the patentee the right to exclude 
others from using the patented invention.186 To be sure, all forms of 
intellectual property share the essential right to exclude others from 
using, without permission, the copyright, patent, trademark, or trade 
secret.187 
Despite the statutory definition of what rights a patent grants a 
patentee, it is still common to perceive a patent’s grant as a de facto 
monopoly for the patentee to make, use, and sell the invention, and 
with it the ability to license those same rights to a licensee.188 
Common experience with tangible personal or real property may make 
it difficult for many people to conceive of a right to exclude without 
simultaneously having the right to use tangible property.189 However, 
because intellectual property is intangible, the concept of having only 
the right to exclude and not the right to use becomes troublesome for 
                                                                                                                   
for the term of seventeen years, of the exclusive right to make, use, 
and vend the invention or discovery. 
Bauer, 229 U.S. at 9-10. 
185 See Richardson v. Suzuki, 868 F2d. 1226, 1247 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“The right 
to exclude recognized in a patent is but the essence of the concept of property”).  
186 See, e.g., Special Equip. Co. v. Coe, 324 U.S. 370, 378 (1945) (“The patent 
grant is not of a right to the patentee to use the invention, for that he already 
possesses. It is a grant of the right to exclude others from using it. As the statute, R. 
S. § 4884, provides, the grant is of the “exclusive right to make, use, and vend” the 
invention”). 
187 Kenneth L. Port, Jay Dratler, Jr., Faye M. Hammersley, Terence P. 
McElwee, Charles R. McManis & Barbara A. Wrigley, LICENSING INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 6 (2d ed. 2005) (“The direct impact of 
intellectual property is entirely negative: it prevents those who do not own it form 
doing things they otherwise might lawfully and productively do, normally without 
invading any ones’ tangible property”). 
188 See Part IA, supra. 
189 Kenneth L. Port, Jay Dratler, Jr., Faye M. Hammersley, Terence P. 
McElwee, Charles R. McManis & Barbara A. Wrigley, LICENSING INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 5-6 (2d ed. 2005). 
26
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 2, Iss. 2 [2007], Art. 13
http://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol2/iss2/13
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                           Volume 2, Issue 2                       Spring 2007 
822 
many. An example of why this distinction is important will help 
illuminate the concept, and explain how the distinction affects 
licensing agreements. 
Suppose inventor Jon holds a patent for a widget with elements 
A+B+C and inventor Kate holds a patent for a widget with elements 
A+B. Despite Jon’s patent, Kate may still exclude Jon from making, 
using, or selling his widget with elements A+B+C, because it would 
infringe Kate’s patent for a widget with elements A+B. Kate’s patent 
claim would read on Jon’s widget.190 Inventor Kate owns a 
“dominating” patent.191  
The following drawing helps to visualize this situation where 
Jon’s patent for a widget with elements A+B+C is the inner circle, and 
Kate’s patent for a widget with elements A+B is the outer circle 
encompassing Jon’s inner circle. The drawing represents how Kate’s 
“dominate” patent prevents Jon from freely using his invention; Kate 
has the right to exclude Jon from using any widget that includes 
elements A+B. Even though the law grants Jon the right to exclude 
others from using his invention, he himself does not have the right to 
use his invention without Kate’s consent. 
 
                                                 
190 “Read on” is a term of art in patent litigation. See 8 Donald S. Chisum, 
CHISUM ON PATENTS Glossary (2001) (Explaining meaning of the term “reads on” as 
“a claim ‘reads on’ or covers products or processes that contain all of the elements 
and limitations of the claim”). 
191 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1156 (8th ed. 2004) on blocking patent, 
dominating patent, and fencing patent. 
A+B 
A+B+C
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A similar situation, often referred to as a “blocking patent,”192 
would arise if Jon instead held a patent for a widget with elements 
A+C, yet Jon makes, uses, and sells a widget with elements A+B+C. 
In that case, both Jon and Kate could prevent each other from making, 
using, or selling a widget with elements A+B+C. This is because Jon’s 
patent claim including elements A+B and Kate’s patent claim 
including elements A+C would read on the widget with elements 
A+B+C, each patent “blocking” the other’s use of the widget.193 
The following drawing helps to visualize this situation, where 
Jon’s patent for a widget with elements A+C is the right circle, and 
Kate’s patent for a widget with elements A+B is the left circle. The 
overlapping area of the two circles represents the overlapping patent 
rights that Kate and Jon share. The drawing represents how Kate and 
Jon’s patents “block” each other from freely using their inventions 
without the other’s consent.  
Kate has the right to exclude Jon from using any widget that 
includes elements A+B and Jon has the right to exclude Kate from 
using any widget that includes elements A+C. Even though the law 
grants Jon and Kate the right to exclude others from using their 
respective inventions, neither Jon nor Kate has the right to use their 
invention without the other’s consent. Cross-licensing the patents 
would permit both Jon and Kate to make, use, and sell the widget 
A+B+C.194  
 
                                                 
192 Id. 
193 Id. 
194 Id. 
A+B A+C 
A+B+C 
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The previous hypotheticals are not mere mental gymnastics to 
illuminate theories of patent law, but they occur in actual court cases, 
and affect their outcomes.195 Why is the distinction between the right 
to use and the right to exclude important? It is important because 
understanding what rights a patent grants a patentee shapes what rights 
a licensee receives from the patentee, and thus what a patent license 
constitutes. 
Notwithstanding the actual language of a license agreement, a 
patent license is not a grant of rights to the licensee to use the 
invention; rather, a patent license is an agreement that the licensor will 
not sue the licensee, so long as neither party breaches the 
agreement.196 According to the Supreme Court, a patent license 
“amounts to no more than ‘a mere waiver of the right to sue.’”197 The 
federal courts of appeal have also declared that a patent license is 
nothing more than a promise not to sue.198 In fact, a patentee has no 
other obligations to the licensee,199 even to the point that a patentee 
does not have to sue other infringers of the licensed patent.200 Neither 
                                                 
195 United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 297 (1948) (“These 
patents in separate hands produced a deadlock. Lemmon by his basic patent 
‘blocked’ Schultz's improvement. Cross-licenses furnished appellees a solution”). 
196 U.S. Philips Corp. v. ITC, 424 F.3d 1179, 1189 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
197 Gen. Talking Pictures v. W. Elec. Co., 304 U.S. 175, 181 (1938) (quoting 
De Forest Radio Tel. Co. v. United States, 273 U.S. 236, 242 (1927)). It should be 
noted that an exclusive licensee receives more in addition to the promise not to sue, 
namely the ability to sue others for infringement in some circumstances. See Part IC, 
supra. 
198 See W. Elec. Co. v. Pacent Reproducer Corp., 42 F.2d 116, 118 (2d Cir. 
1930) (noting that “a license grants to the licensee merely a privilege that protects 
him from a claim of infringement by the owner of the patent”); Rite-Hite Corp. v. 
Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (noting that a licensee 
with a bare license “has received only the patentee’s promise that [the licensee] will 
not be sued for infringement”); U.S. Philips Corp., 424 F.3d at 1189 (noting that “a 
nonexclusive patent license is simply a promise not to sue for infringement”). 
199 Again, this is for a “bare licensee”, which is a minimum received by all 
licensees, though exclusive licensees receive more rights. See Part IC, supra. 
200 W. Elec. Co., 42 F.2d at 118 (noting that a patentee may freely enter 
licensing agreements with others or even tolerate infringers, and in neither case 
violate the rights of the patent licensee, though such actions may cause the licensee 
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does the licensee have any other obligations to the patentee outside the 
terms of the agreement.201 
Why have courts declared that a patent license is nothing more 
than a promise not to sue or a mere waiver of a right to sue? Recall 
that the patentee does not have the right to use the patented invention; 
rather the patentee has the right to exclude others from making, using, 
selling, or offering to sell the invention.202 Therefore, if the patentee 
does not have the right to use the invention, then how can the patentee 
grant the licensee a right to use the invention when the patentee does 
not have that right themselves? 
The Federal Circuit acknowledged this absurdity. Based on the 
exclusionary rights granted a patentee, the Federal Circuit reasoned as 
follows about the actual nature of a patent license: 
 
Even if [a patent license is] couched in terms of 
“licensee is given the right to make, use, or sell X,” the 
agreement cannot convey that absolute right because 
not even the patentee of X is given that right. His right 
is merely one to exclude others from making, using or 
selling X, 35 U.S.C. § 154. Indeed, the patentee of X 
and his licensee, when making, using, or selling X, can 
be subject to suit under other patents.203 
 
Because a patentee cannot grant a right to that which it does not have, 
the Federal Circuit held that “[a]s a threshold matter, a patent license 
                                                                                                                   
“pecuniary loss,” but “no legal injury”). This of course assumes that the terms of the 
license do not require or prevent such conduct by the patentee.  
201 U.S. Philips Corp., 424 F.3d at 1189 (noting that granting a license “does 
not obligate the licensee to do anything; it simply provides the licensee with a 
guarantee that it will not be sued for engaging in conduct that would infringe the 
patent in question”). 
202 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2000) (emphasis added). 
203 Spindelfabrik Suessen-Schurr Stahlecker & Grill GmbH v. Schubert & 
Salzer Maschinenfabrik Aktiengesellschaft, 829 F.2d 1075, 1081 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 
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agreement is in essence nothing more than a promise by the licensor 
not to sue the licensee” for patent infringement.204  
With this understanding, the Federal Circuit recently declared that 
a license is equivalent to a covenant not to sue.205 Even some 
commentators note the implications of viewing a patent license 
agreement as a covenant not to sue on other areas of the law,206 such as 
the assignment of patent licenses in a bankruptcy proceeding.207  
Perhaps the language of the pre-1952 statutes describing the rights 
granted a patentee explains the incorrect definition of a patent license 
found in the 1951 fourth edition of Black’s Law Dictionary.208 Another 
potential reason for the inaccurate definition may be that Congress had 
yet to centralize all appeals of patent cases into a single court, the 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Congress first created the 
                                                 
204 Id.; accord Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1552 (Fed. Cir. 
1995) (“If the party has not received an [exclusive license] i.e., the right to exclude 
others from making, using, or selling the patented invention, the party has a ‘bare 
license,’ and has received only the patentee’s promise that that party will not be sued 
for infringement”). 
205 Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354, 1367 
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[A] license is, in essence, a licensor's covenant not to sue the 
licensee”); see also John C. Phillips, Note, Sui Generis Intellectual Property 
Protection for Computer Software, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 997, 1041 n.212. (1992) 
(“A ‘license’ in the patent law context may be defined as a covenant not to sue for 
infringement in exchange for a royalty”). 
206Michelle Morgan Harner, Carl E. Black, and Eric R. Goodman, Debtors 
Beware: The Expanding Universe of Non-Assumable/Non-Assignable Contracts in 
Bankruptcy, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 187, 211 (2005) (“[L]icense agreements 
are covenants not to sue-i.e., the licensor agrees not to sue the licensee for patent 
infringement if the licensee uses the patented invention and performs (such as by 
paying royalties) in accordance with the terms of the license agreement”). 
207 Id. at 212. 
208 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1068 (4th ed. 1951). 
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Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 1982209 for the purpose of 
unifying patent law210 among other things.211 
Nevertheless, none of these possible reasons for an erroneous 
definition of a patent license excuses the Seventh Circuit for relying 
on the 1951 definition found in Black’s Law Dictionary when the 
Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit have explicated a correct 
definition of a patent license. 
 
2. A license may be retroactive. 
 
In deciding the Waterloo case, the Seventh Circuit also relied on 
the notion that a license has only prospective qualities.212 To reinforce 
that notion, the Seventh Circuit incorrectly defined a patent license as 
a grant to the licensee of the right to use the patented invention, which 
can only be forward looking.213 However, patent licenses may have 
both prospective and retrospective qualities, in part because a patent 
license is in essence a promise not to sue.214 Other types of intellectual 
property also recognize retroactive licensing agreements.215 
                                                 
209 The Federal Court Improvements Act of 1982 (FCIA) established the Court 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC), Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (relevant 
provisions codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). 
210 Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., 535 U.S. 826, 838 
(2002) (noting that the Federal Circuit “was created, in part, to promote uniformity 
in the development [patent] law”). 
211 See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in 
Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 2-4 (1989) (noting administrative 
efficiency and reduced forum shopping as some other reasons). 
212 Waterloo Furniture Components Ltd. v. Haworth, Inc., 467 F. 3d 641, 647 
(7th Cir. 2006). 
213 Id. 
214 See Part IIIA1, supra. 
215 See, e.g., Dov S. Greenbaum, Comment, THE DATABASE DEBATE: IN 
SUPPORT OF AN INEQUITABLE SOLUTION, 13 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 431, 515 n.160 
(2003) (noting that Texaco agreed to pay a seven-figure settlement and retroactive 
licensing fee to the CCC for a copyright infringement claim). 
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The Federal Circuit has acknowledged on various occasions both 
implicitly216 and explicitly217 that a patent license may be retroactive. 
Additionally, the Sixth Circuit explicitly held that “a release [from past 
infringement] can, in certain circumstances, have the effect of and be 
construed as a license.”218 Various district courts have also recognized 
the retroactive nature of patent licenses in the form of a settlement for 
past infringement.219 
Moreover, most patent infringement cases settle220 with the parties 
entering some form of licensing agreement.221 Settlement in a general 
                                                 
216 See Intel Corp. v. ULSI Sys. Tech., 995 F.2d 1566, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1993) 
(noting that Intel and HP entered into a cross-licensing agreement granting each 
other “an ‘irrevocable, retroactive, nonexclusive, world-wide, royalty-free license’ 
under all patents and patent applications covered by the agreement”); Enzo APA & 
Son v. Geapag A.G., 134 F.3d 1090, 1092 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“By its terms, the 
Spidem-Geapag License is retroactive, effective as of December 4, 1992, thus 
predating the first filed action”); Ethicon, Inc. v. United States Surgical Corp., 135 
F.3d 1456, 1467 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (recognizing that a patent license may cover past 
infringement, although absent an agreement between co-owners, a license granted by 
one co-owner and not the others will only operate prospectively).  
217 Studiengesellschaft Kohle, m.b.H. v. Hercules, Inc., 105 F.3d 629, 634 (Fed. 
Cir. 1997) (ruling that a MFL licensee was entitled to a retroactive license). 
218 Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 482 F.2d 317, 320 (6th 
Cir. 1973). 
219See Burlington Indus. v. Solutia, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 2d 433, 437 (D. N.C. 
2003) (“After reviewing the License Agreement, Settlement Agreement, and 
Consent Decree, it is apparent that Plaintiff and Rossville entered into a patent 
license agreement [for past use of the patented technology]”); Jacobson v. Cox 
Paving Co., No. 89-1786 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17787, at *19 (D. Ariz. 1991) 
(“Mr. Jacobson purchased the McDonald patents in 1986 and retroactively licensed 
the infringing activities of Arizona Refining”); see also Willemijn 
Houdstermaatschappij, BV v. Standard Microsystems Corp., 925 F. Supp. 193, 196 
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (“A licensor's grant of immunity from suit in settlement of a dispute 
under a prior license agreement is ‘the equivalent of a license’ and may trigger 
another licensee’s most-favored-licensee clause”), vacated on other grounds, 103 
F.3d 9 (2d Cir. 1997).  
220 Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, How Are Patent Cases Resolved? An 
Empirical Examination of the Adjudication and Settlement of Patent Disputes, 84 
WASH. U. L. REV. 237, 259 (2006) (finding that about eighty percent of patent cases 
settle). 
221 Id. at 275. 
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sense may occur before actual litigation begins or anytime 
thereafter.222 Because the parties settle usually after infringement has 
allegedly occurred, thus precipitating the lawsuit or the threat of 
litigation, licensing agreements typically have a retroactive effective 
date, and thus embrace both prospective and retrospective qualities.223 
To illustrate this point further, consider the first variation of the 
previous “Kate and Jon” hypothetical where Jon makes a widget 
having elements A+B+C, which infringes Kate’s patent for a widget 
having elements A+B. Kate has yet to file a lawsuit, but both agree 
that Jon has been infringing Kate’s patent for the past 3 years and that 
her patent would withstand a validity challenge. Because of the threat 
of litigation, Jon and Kate, enter into a licensing agreement a week 
before Kate’s patent expires although negotiations began just under a 
year ago. 
Jon agrees to pay a lump-sum royalty to Kate within two months 
of the execution date of the agreement. The lump-sum royalty covers 
Jon’s past infringing acts as well as his future use of the invention for 
the remaining week left on the life of the patent. Although the 
licensing agreement contains mostly retrospective features and only 
marginally prospective ones, it is nevertheless a license: Kate has 
promised not to sue Jon for past and future infringement in exchange 
for a lump-sum royalty payment. Courts consider lump-sum royalties 
                                                 
222 Id. at 256-57; see also Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Limits to Patent Settlements, 
34 RAND J. ECON. 391, 392 (2003) (“I do not distinguish between settlements that 
take place after patent litigation commences and those that take place before the 
filing of a patent lawsuit. Both types of settlements take place in the shadow of an 
ultimate court ruling on patent validity and/or infringement”). 
223 In fact, the licensing agreement between Haworth and Waterloo was 
executed in December 1992 but had an effective date of October 1, 1992. Waterloo 
Furniture Components v. Haworth, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 2d 950, 952 (N.D. Ill 2005). 
Thus, Waterloo paid Haworth a certain monetary amount to cover past infringing 
acts that occurred prior to the execution of the licensing agreement and any future 
ones up to the expiration date of the patent, a retroactive and prospective license. 
See, e.g., Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 482 F.2d 317, 318 
n.2 (1973) (Shatterproof began negotiations in 1952, which concluded in 1955 with a 
license agreement having an effective date of Jan. 1, 1954); id. at 319 (In 1962, 
Libbey-Owens-Ford executed a license agreement with Ford having an effective date 
of Jan. 1, 1961).  
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the same as continuing royalty payments in that they fulfill the 
licensee’s obligation to pay the patentee for the license.224 
Consider the legal effects, if any, on the outcome when the facts 
of the hypothetical are altered. In this variation, the negotiation 
process took longer and an agreement was reached a week after the 
patent expired, but all the other terms were the same. Now the 
licensing agreement contains only retrospective features. Despite the 
patent’s expiration, the agreement is still a patent license: Kate has 
promised not to sue Jon for past infringement in exchange for a lump-
sum royalty fee. A patentee’s authority to grant a retroactive patent 
license is what enables the settlement of a patent infringement suit and 
is indistinguishable from a settlement.225 
 
3. Expired patents retain some value to the patentee. 
 
The Seventh Circuit also incorrectly implied that once a patent 
expires, the patentee can no longer enforce his patent rights based on 
the expired patent, bolstering its claim that a license has only 
prospective qualities.226 While the patentee’s power to exclude others 
no longer exists after a patent’s expiration,227 “a patent does have 
                                                 
224 Hazeltine Corp. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 100 F.2d 10, 16 (7th Cir. 1938) 
(“‘Royalty,’ when used in connection with a license under a patent, means the 
compensation paid by the licensee to the licensor for the use of the licensor's 
patented invention”); see Studiengesellschaft Kohle, m.b.H. v. Hercules, Inc., 105 
F.3d 629, 633 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“The ordinary meaning of the term ‘paying licensee’ 
is one who gives money for a license . . . we see no distinction between one who 
makes an up-front, lump-sum payment and one who makes continuing royalty 
payments. Indeed, such a distinction would be doubly doubtful because a ‘paid-up’ 
license presumably includes potential future royalty payments discounted to their net 
present value”). 
225 See De Forest Radio Tel. Co. v. United States, 273 U.S. 236, 241-42, (1927) 
(settlement and license have the same legal effect); Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. 
Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 482 F.2d 317, 320 (6th Cir. 1973) (settlement may be 
deemed equivalent to a retroactive license). 
226 Waterloo Furniture Components Ltd. v. Haworth, Inc., 467 F. 3d 641, 647-
48 (7th Cir. 2006). 
227 35 U.S.C § 154(a)(2) (2006). 
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value beyond its expiration date.”228 By statute, a patentee may still 
sue an infringer for past infringement committed during the life of the 
patent.229 
A patentee may still recover standard remedies when suing for 
past infringement of an expired patent. For example, a patentee whose 
right to exclude expired with the patent may yet be able to obtain post-
patent-expiration injunctions.230 A patentee may want to seek an 
injunction after a patent has expired for two basic reasons. First, a 
patentee may request the injunctions to destroy infringing items made 
during the patent’s lifetime or “articles made from an infringing 
machine or process.”231 Another reason for a post-expiration 
injunction is to enjoin the infringer “from making the patented item for 
the amount of time it would take for the infringer to recreate the 
invention after the patent expired.”232  
Injunctions are not the only remedy available to a patentee after a 
patent expires. A patentee may recover money damages as well.233 
Although sometimes misunderstood as a statute of limitations,234 
§ 286 caps the amount of damages a patentee may recover from an 
infringer for any infringement committed more than six years prior to 
filing the lawsuit.235 In other words, “one starts from the filing of a 
[patent-infringement lawsuit] and counts backward [six years] to 
                                                 
228 In re Morgan, 990 F.2d 1230, 1232 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
229 35 U.S.C. § 286 (2000); accord In re Morgan, 990 F.2d at 1232. (tersely 
noting that “a patent may be sued on after it expires”). 
230 See generally Christopher A. Cotropia, Note, Post-Expiration Patent 
Injunctions, 7 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 105 (1998). 
231 Id. at 106-07. 
232 Id. (This is because if the infringer had respected the patentee’s rights, they 
would not be able to recreate the invention until after the patent expires. In other 
words, by infringing the patent, the infringer received an unlawful head start on 
recreating the invention for lawful use after patent expiration. A post-expiration 
injunction would deprive the infringer of that head start).  
233 See 35 U.S.C. § 286 (2000). 
234 Standard Oil Co. v. Nippon Shokubai Kagaku Kogyo Co., 754 F.2d 345, 
348 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
235 35 U.S.C. § 286 (2000) (“Except as otherwise provided by law, no recovery 
shall be had for any infringement committed more than six years prior to the filing of 
the complaint or counterclaim for infringement in the action”). 
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determine the date before which [the patentee may no longer recover 
damages].”236 
A patentee may therefore still derive value from an expired patent 
either by commencing a law suit or seeking a licensing agreement with 
the alleged infringer up to six years after the patent expired.237 
Remember, this is not an unlawful extension of the patent term 
because the patentee may not recover damages for use of the patented 
invention after the patent expires.238 Rather, if a patentee first 
discovers after the patent expired that an infringer committed 
infringing acts before the patent’s expiration, the patentee may recover 
those damages.  
Logically then, a patentee can resolve any patent dispute with an 
infringer after the patent has expired by either entering a licensing or 
settlement agreement covering the past infringing acts. The infringer’s 
ability to enter into retroactive agreements confirms the notion that 
settlement agreements may be considered a licensing agreement, even 
if the patent has expired, and especially if a MFL clause is implicated. 
Thus, the Seventh Circuit erroneously concluded that a patent 
license has only prospective qualities. In reality, the legal effect of a 
license, a promise not to sue, may cover both past and future 
infringing acts in exchange for an agreed upon consideration. 
 
B. Ignoring De Forest for the Trees and 
Disregarding the Federal Circuit 
 
In the second misstep, the court arguably ignored the Supreme 
Court’s analysis of the legal effects of a patent license and should have 
been more deferential to the Federal Circuit, the court Congress 
especially created to determine patent issues and bring uniformity to 
patent laws.239 
                                                 
236 Standard Oil Co., 754 F.2d at 348. 
237 See, e.g., In re Morgan, 990 F.2d 1230, 1232 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
238 See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000). 
239 Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., 535 U.S. 826, 838 
(2002) (noting that the Federal Circuit “was created, in part, to promote uniformity 
in the development [patent] law”). 
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The Seventh Circuit should have looked to the Supreme Court and 
the Federal Circuit for the correct definition of a patent license. The 
Supreme Court has held on multiple occasions that a license in the 
context of patent law “amounts to no more than ‘a mere waiver of the 
right to sue.’”240 In De Forest Radio Telephone Co. v United States,241 
the pre-eminent Supreme Court case explaining the meaning of a 
patent license, the American Telephone Company released the United 
States and “all manufactures acting under its orders” from any 
infringement claims stemming from the United States’ use and 
manufacture of a patented invention for use in World War I.242  
The De Forest Radio Telephone Company, the holder of patents 
for the invention, later sued the United States for infringement.243 
However, De Forest granted certain rights in the patent to Western 
Electric Company, who subsequently conveyed the rights to the 
American Telephone Company.244 The agreement included the right of 
De Forest and Western Electric to sue others for any of the patents 
“within the fields in which each respectively possessed rights,” 245 and 
to license to the United States use of the patented technology.246 A 
license would serve as a complete defense to claims of patent 
infringement by either company.247 
In holding that American Telephone Company’s actions created an 
implied license with the United States Government,248 the Court also 
explicated the nature of a patent license. The Court noted, “No formal 
granting of a license is necessary in order to give it effect.”249 
                                                 
240 Gen. Talking Pictures v. West. Elec. Co., 304 U.S. 175, 181 (1938) (quoting 
De Forest Radio Tel. Co. v. United States, 273 U.S. 236, 242 (1927)). 
241 273 U.S. 236 (1927). 
242 Id. at 239-40. 
243 Id. at 237. 
244 Id. at 238. 
245 Id. 
246 Id. at 240. 
247 Id. 
248 Id. at 242. 
249 Id. at 241. 
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Moreover, the court approvingly quoted an earlier Supreme Court case 
that declared a license is “a mere waiver of the right to sue.”250 
The Federal Circuit stands with the Supreme Court in its case law, 
when explicating the nature of a patent license.251 Although Federal 
Circuit decisions do not bind the Seventh Circuit,252 even in matters of 
patent law,253 the Seventh Circuit should give deference to the Federal 
Circuit in matters implicating patent law,254 similar to the manner in 
which the Federal Circuit defers to its sister appellate courts when 
deciding matters not implicating patent law, such as procedural issues 
and substantive issues not involving patent law.255  
One commentator argued for deference to the Federal Circuit 
while recognizing that the Federal Circuit’s decisions do not bind 
regional appellate and state courts, in this manner: 
 
The most obvious law for the regional appellate courts 
and state courts to apply to patent issues is that of the 
Federal Circuit. However, federal appellate courts are 
                                                 
250 Id. at 242 (quoting Henry v. Dick Co. 224 U.S. 1, 24 (1912)). 
251 See generally Part IIIA1, supra.  
252 Kohler Co. v. Moen Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 644 (7th Cir. 1993) (Cudahy, J. 
dissenting). 
253 See Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 870 F.2d 1292, 1299 (7th 
Cir. 1989). 
254 But see Larry D. Thompson, Jr., Adrift on a Sea of Uncertainty: Preserving 
Uniformity in Patent Law Post-Vornado Through Deference to the Federal Circuit, 
92 GEO. L.J. 523, 526 (“Generally, however, federal courts of appeals follow what 
can be called the ‘rule of no deference,’ which allows courts to treat the decisions of 
coordinate federal courts as persuasive, but prohibits deference to them”). 
255 One commentator summarized the Federal Circuit’s deference as follows: 
[The Federal Circuit] applies regional circuit law to procedural 
issues that are not themselves substantive patent law issues so long 
as they do not (1) pertain to patent law, (2) bear an essential 
relationship to matters committed to [the court’s] exclusive control 
by statute, or (3) clearly implicate the jurisprudential 
responsibilities of [the court] in a field within its exclusive 
jurisdiction. 
Sean M. McEldowney, Comment, The “Essential Relationship” Spectrum: A 
Framework For Addressing Choice of Procedural Law In The Federal Circuit, 153 
U. PA. L. REV. 1639, 1668 (2000). 
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not bound by Federal Circuit law and do not have 
sovereignty-based reasons for following it, as they do 
with state law. Therefore, the basis for their deference 
to Federal Circuit law should come from three places. 
First, it generally is more efficient for regional circuits 
to follow the Federal Circuit so the appellate courts do 
not need to develop new law. Second, the courts should 
respect the congressional purpose of creating a uniform 
body of patent law. Finally and most tenuously, the 
regional circuits should honor Federal Circuit law to 
promote comity among the circuit courts, which the 
Federal Circuit has, at least in principle, supported. 
Perhaps such respect for the Federal Circuit law will 
generate a reciprocal respect in the Federal Circuit for 
regional circuit law, transforming its purported 
adherence to regional circuit law on nonpatent issues 
into actual adherence.256 
 
However, what about issues before the courts that involve matters 
of both patent law and other areas of law, or issues that merely 
implicate patent law? For instance, some decisions that may have a 
“substantial effect on patent law” involve antitrust, contracts, 
copyrights, federal business law tort claims such as trade dress 
infringement, patent licensing disputes, and state law business 
disparagement claims.257 In those cases that implicate patent law or 
involve matters of patent law, other regional appellate and state courts 
should defer to the Federal Circuit in order to promote the 
congressional intent of a uniform body of patent law.258  
                                                 
256 Ravi V. Sitwala, Note, In Defense of Holmes v. Vornado: Addressing The 
Unwarranted Criticism, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 452, 477 (2004). 
257 Scott Cole, Note and Comment, The Rise And Fall Of Patent Law 
Uniformity And The Need For Congressional Response, 81 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 713, 
725-26 (2006). 
258 Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., 535 U.S. 826, 838 
(2002) (noting that the Federal Circuit “was created, in part, to promote uniformity 
in the development [patent] law”); see Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense 
Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 645 (1999) (“The need for uniformity in 
40
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Other regional appellate courts have understood the need for a 
uniform body of patent law, and have deferred to the Federal Circuit 
precedent when deciding issues implicating patent law. For example, 
the Ninth Circuit, in a bankruptcy proceeding, upheld the district 
court’s decision, preventing the assignability of a patent license by the 
debtor.259 In so doing, the Ninth Circuit looked to federal patent law, 
as promulgated by the Federal Circuit court, to govern its decision, 
even though federal patent law may have conflicted with California 
state law.260  
The court justified their conclusion by emphasizing the 
importance of federal patent policy and a uniform rule of “modern 
federal decision” regarding the non-assignability of nonexclusive 
patent licenses.261 Additionally, the Ninth Circuit cited Seventh Circuit 
precedent that also held that federal patent law governed the 
assignability of a patent license,262 which means the Seventh Circuit 
not only understands this principle but even applied it and 
incorporated it into its own case law. Notably, the Ninth Circuit also 
looked to the Supreme Court’s De Forest decision for a definition of a 
patent license, 263 which definition the Federal Circuit case law 
supports.264 
In order to follow the Congressional directive for a uniform body 
of patent law, the Seventh Circuit should have followed the Ninth 
Circuit’s example and looked to the Supreme Court and the Federal 
Circuit to inform its definition of a patent license, a key part of their 
                                                                                                                   
the construction of patent law is undoubtedly important”); Cole, supra note 257, at 
725-26. 
259 In re CFLC, Inc., 89 F.3d 673, 680 (9th Cir. 1996) 
260 Id. at 677-79. 
261 Id. at 679-80. 
262 Id. at 677-78 (citing Inc. v. Kelley Co., 465 F.2d 1303, 1306 (7th Cir. 1972) 
(“The question of assignability of a patent license is a specific policy of federal 
patent law dealing with federal patent law. Therefore, we hold federal law applies to 
the question of the assignability of the patent license in question”)). 
263 Id. at 677 (noting that a patent license is a “‘mere waiver of the right to sue’ 
the licensee for infringement”) (quoting De Forest Radio Tel. Co. v. United States, 
273 U.S. 236, 242 (1927)).  
264 See Part IIIA1, supra. 
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reasoning to hold that a settlement agreement may never be a patent 
license.265 
 
C. The calculations for a payment of royalties in a license agreement 
and a settlement agreement are substantially the same. 
 
Third and finally, the Seventh Circuit ignored the actual 
negotiation process and legal effects of both a licensing agreement and 
a settlement agreement for patent infringement. Instead, the Seventh 
Circuit focused on the label of an agreement ending disputes 
negotiated under threat of litigation or actual litigation and not its 
substance.266 
The Seventh Circuit overlooked the fact that a calculation of 
royalty rates267 for a licensing agreement and a settlement agreement 
mimic each other, thus bolstering the notion that settlement 
agreements perform substantially the same function as licensing 
agreements—in other words, a means for the parties to enter some 
form of a covenant not to sue in exchange for an agreed upon 
consideration.268 
                                                 
265 Waterloo Furniture Components Ltd. v. Haworth, Inc., 467 F. 3d 641, 647 
(7th Cir. 2006). 
266 Id. at 647-48. 
267Royalty as used here means any compensation paid to the licensor for a 
license, See Hazeltine Corp. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 100 F.2d 10, 16.(7th Cir. 1938) 
(“‘Royalty’ when used in connection with a license under a patent, means the 
compensation paid by the licensee to the licensor for the use of the licensor’s 
patented invention”)). 
268 See, e.g., Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 
1354, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[A] license is, in essence, a licensor's covenant not to 
sue the licensee”); see also John C. Phillips, Note, Sui Generis Intellectual Property 
Protection for Computer Software, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 997, 1041 n.212 (1992) 
(“A ‘license’ in the patent law context may be defined as a covenant not to sue for 
infringement in exchange for a royalty”). For a settlement as a covenant not to sue, 
see, e.g., Microchip Tech. Inc. v. Chamberlain Group, 441 F.3d 936, 942 (Fed. Cir. 
2006) (noting that the parties’ settlement agreement was a covenant not to sue). 
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Because damages for patent infringement are calculated using lost 
profits or a reasonable royalty rate, and sometimes both,269 settlement 
amounts will, in large part, be based on either lost profits or a 
reasonable royalty rate.270 Thus, a settlement based on the reasonable 
royalty rate mimics the negotiation process the parties would have had 
if they instead entered into a licensing agreement.271  
When a court determines damages for past patent infringement 
employing a reasonable royalty calculation, it conjures up what royalty 
rate the parties hypothetically would have agreed to if they sat across 
the bargaining table on the day infringement began and had instead 
entered into a license agreement.272 In other words, if the parties had 
negotiated a license agreement on the day infringement began, the 
royalty rate the patentee would have charged the infringer for use of 
the invention is the same rate calculation that the court would use to 
assess the amount of damages the infringer owes the patentee. 
The actions of the parties in negotiating a royalty rate for a license 
or a settlement agreement has the same legal effect, as the Supreme 
                                                 
269 35 U.S.C. § 286 (2000); State Indus., Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus., Inc., 883 F.2d 
1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“The [damages] award may be split between lost 
profits as actual damages to the extent they are proven and a reasonable royalty for 
the remainder”). 
270 See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 222, at 392 (“Virtually every patent license 
can be viewed as a settlement of a patent dispute: the royalty rate presumably 
reflects the two parties’ strengths or weaknesses in patent litigation in conjunction 
with the licensee’s ability to invent around the patent”). 
271 Kesan & Ball, supra note 220, at 254 (“Obviously, an out-of-court 
negotiation of a licensing agreement is similar to a negotiation of a settlement 
agreement once the case has been filed”); see also Shapiro, supra note 222, at 392 
(“I do not distinguish between settlements that take place after patent litigation 
commences and those that take place before the filing of a patent lawsuit. Both types 
of settlements take place in the shadow of an ultimate court ruling on patent validity 
and/or infringement”). 
272 Hanson v. Alpine Valley Ski Area, 718 F.2d 1075, 1078 (Fed. Cir. 1983) 
(“Hypothetical negotiations should be the result of supposed meeting between the 
patentee and the infringer at the time infringement began”); accord Unisplay S.a. v. 
Am. Elec. Sign Co., Inc., 69 F.3d 512, 518 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“The key element in 
setting a reasonably royalty is the need to return to the date when the infringement 
began”). 
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Court’s De Forest case supports.273 As a commentator put it, “royalties 
simply force the patentee to issue a retroactive license.”274 
Recognizing that similar tactics, processes, and legal outcomes 
accompany license agreement and settlement agreement negotiations 
led one firm to advertise their skills in “Adversarial Patent Licensing 
Negotiations,” concluding that “adversarial patent licensing 
negotiations had many of the same qualities as settlement of pending 
litigation.” 275 
Because a settlement agreement and a license agreement are 
largely based on the same royalty rate calculations and result in the 
same legal effect, a settlement agreement should be considered a 
license. 
 
IV. EFFECTS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S RULING 
 
Legal issues surrounding intellectual property continue to increase 
in importance and national attention,276 especially as intellectual 
property becomes an increasingly larger portion of a company’s assets, 
and by extension a nation’s economy.277 For example, some 
commentators note patent law’s newfound stature, due to the Supreme 
Court’s recent zeal to grant writs of certiorari in patent cases decided 
at the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.278 In 2006 alone, the 
                                                 
273 See, e.g., De Forest Radio Tel. Co. v. United States, 273 U.S. 236, 241-42 
(1927) (release and license have the same legal effect). 
274 Mohamed Yusuf M. Mohamed, Note, Unjust Enrichment for Patent 
Infringement: A Novel Idea, 4 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 123, 127 (1997). 
275 See “Adversarial Patent Licensing Negotiations” found at 
http://www.mofo.com/practice/practice/intellectualproperty/adversarial/overview.ht
ml. (last visited April 16, 2007). 
276 Jess Bravin, Battleground Shifts to High Court, WALL ST. J., Nov. 28, 2006, 
at A1. 
277 A. Tracy Gomes and Thomas George, Patent Value Continues to Soar in 
2005, INTELLECTUAL ASSET MANAGEMENT, February/March 2006, at 34. 
278 Harold C. Wegner, Top Ten Supreme Court Patent Cases, Mar. 9, 2006, p. 
3-4; available at http://patentlaw.typepad.com/patent/SupremeCourtMARCH9.pdf 
(last visited Apr. 16, 2007). 
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high court has granted certiorari in six patent cases, “more cases in a 
single year than any [year] since the 1960s.”279 
Compare that number to the period just after the mid twentieth 
century: “[During] the next three decades, the Court averaged barely 
one patent decision per year, or less than one-third its average from the 
first half of the [twentieth] century.”280 Consider the high court’s 
patent caseload even more recently. Since the 1982 inception of the 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, during “the twelve terms 
between 1983 and 1994 (inclusive), the Court heard five patent 
cases.”281 No wonder a commentator declared in 2001 “[t]he Supreme 
Court has rendered itself well nigh invisible in modern substantive 
patent law.”282 The Supreme Court has reasserted its influence in 
patent law, given the recent uptick in patent cases heard by the Court, 
as evidenced in the previous five terms283 and the current term.284  
                                                 
279 Brian Prince, U.S. Supreme Court Ponders Patent Rules, eWeek, Nov. 28, 
2006, available at http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,1895,2065019,00.asp, (last 
visited Apr. 16, 2007). 
280 John R. Duffy, The Festo Decision and the Return of the Supreme Court to 
the Bar of Patents, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 273, 275. For a more detailed discussion of 
the frequency with which the Supreme Court heard patent cases over the past two 
centuries, see id. at 285-301. 
281 Id. at 297. 
282 Mark D. Janis, Patent Law in the Age of the Invisible Supreme Court, 2001 
U. ILL. L. REV. 387, 387 (2001). 
283 Three cases during the 2001-2002 term: J.E.M. Ag Supply v. Pioneer Hi-
Bred Int’l, 534 U.S. 124 (2001), Holmes Group Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation 
Sys., 535 U.S. 826 (2002), and Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki 
Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002); no cases during the 2002-2003 and 2003-2004 terms; one 
case during the 2004-2005 term: Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 
U.S. 193 (2005); four cases during the 2005-2006 term: Unitherm Food Sys. v. 
Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 546 U.S. 394 (2006), Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 
547 U.S. 28 (2006), Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 126 S. Ct. 
2921 (2006), eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006). 
284 Three cases during the 2006-2007 term: MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, 
Inc., 127 S. Ct. 764 (2007), KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007), 
and Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746 (2007). 
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Given this backdrop, licensing of patented technology will 
likewise increase in importance,285 especially because of the Court’s 
recent decision in eBay v. MercExchange,286 where the Court 
eliminated the usual rule that a finding of patent infringement entitles 
the patentee to a permanent injunction.287 Because a court will no 
longer grant a permanent injunction to a patentee as a matter of course 
after proving infringement, the parties may be more inclined to enter 
licensing agreements for the technology covered by the disputed 
patents.288 Or, perhaps more worrisome to unwilling patent holders, 
the parties could even be forced to enter a license agreement as part of 
a court’s judgment.289  
Given the likelihood of increased emphasis placed on patent 
license agreements, the Seventh Circuit created a general rule that was 
not really well thought out. For example, under the new rule, a 
patentee could undermine the purpose of a MFL clause by entering a 
                                                 
285 A. Tracy Gomes and Thomas George, Patent Value Continues to Soar in 
2005, INTELLECTUAL ASSET MANAGEMENT, February/March 2006, at 34-35 (noting 
in 2005 $300-$500 million in patent litigation settlements, a $1.35 billion verdict, 
and a $525 future royalty payment buyout: “With patent applications up, patent 
awards/settlements up and more individuals, assertion companies and corporations 
asserting their IP rights, it is hard to imagine the future being anything other than 
more of the same). Compare those amounts with the recent record setting $1.52 
billion verdict in the Lucent v. Microsoft cases discussed in Saul Hansell, MP3 
Patents in Upheaval After Verdict, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2007, at C1. 
286 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006) 
287 Id. at 1841. 
288 Patently-O Patent Law Blog, 
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2006/05/supreme_court_v.html, (last visited Apr. 
16, 2007) (“Because the industry competitor has a higher likelihood of obtaining an 
injunction, it should be willing to pay more for the patent. Interestingly, this 
valuation gap may spur more licenses and patent transfers”); but see Yixin H. Tang, 
Note, The Future of Patent Development After eBay v. MercExchange, 20 HARV. 
J.L. & TECH. 235, 250 (2006) (“[Large] corporations now have even less financial 
incentive to license from non-practicing patent owners”). 
289 This is commonly termed a compulsory license. In the post-eBay world 
where permanent injunctions are no longer a matter of course after a finding of 
patent infringement, a district court has already granted a compulsory license: 
Finisar Corp. v. DIRECTV Group, Inc., No. 1:05-CV-264, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
76380, at *4 (E.D. Tex. July 7, 2006). 
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settlement agreement at a lower royalty rate with the MFL licensee’s 
competitor during the course of a patent infringement suit. The 
patentee may worry that its patent will be found invalid if litigation 
continues, and therefore seek to avoid this outcome by inducing the 
MFL licensee’s competitor to accept a settlement at a lower royalty 
rate than the rate offered the MFL licensee. Under the Seventh 
Circuit’s new holding, the MFL licensee has no recourse to prevent 
this outcome.  
At a minimum, a settlement agreement should be considered a 
license agreement for cases implicating a “most favored licensee” 
status.290 An exception to the Seventh Circuit’s general rule, at least in 
the case of MFL licensees, would prevent collusion between the 
patentee and the MFL licensee’s competitor from undermining the 
MFL clause. The outcome of the Waterloo case may have been correct 
assuming the court correctly interpreted the terms of the contract291 but 
the court should not have created a rubric that will govern other 
dissimilar circumstances.  
What can patent practitioners do to take into account the effects of 
the Seventh Circuit’s Waterloo ruling when drafting license 
agreements in the future? Practitioners may want to explicitly contain 
language in a MFL clause to not only include that a MFL licensee is 
entitled to a more favorably rate granted in a future license agreement, 
but also more favorable rates agreed to during any settlement of patent 
infringement disputes covering the same technology outlined in the 
MFL license agreement. Alternatively, practitioners may not want to 
                                                 
290 See Willemijn Houdstermaatschappij, BV v. Standard Microsystems Corp., 
925 F. Supp. 193, 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (“To conclude [that a settlement for prior 
patent infringement is not a license] would allow Willemijn to eviscerate the effect 
of SMC's most-favored-licensee clause by, for example, ‘requiring’ a subsequent 
licensee to pay a higher royalty rate and then waiving the right to sue for all or part 
of that rate), vacated, Willemijn Houdstermaatschappij, BV v. Standard 
Microsystems Corp., 103 F.3d 9 (2d Cir. 1997). 
291 Waterloo Furniture Components Ltd. v. Haworth, Inc., 467 F. 3d 641, 645-
46 (7th Cir. 2006) (The court held that the license agreement expired based on the 
contract’s terms, meaning Haworth had no more obligations to Waterloo at the time 
Haworth and SoftView entered the agreement). 
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label the agreement a license at all, but instead a “covenant not to 
sue.” 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The Seventh Circuit put a “most favored licensee” at a 
competitive disadvantage with other potential licensees. The court 
created a general rule that settlement agreements are not patent 
licenses when the patent has expired. To support the new ruling, the 
court reasoned from an incorrect understanding of what constitutes a 
patent license and its associated prospective and retrospective 
qualities. The Seventh Circuit should have given more deference to the 
Federal Circuit in patent law issues and those cases that implicate 
substantive patent law. The court focused instead on the label attached 
to an agreement and not the processes by which the agreement is 
reached nor its legal effects. 
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